Singular Causation without Dispositions

Theoria 26 (1):35-50 (2011)
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Abstract

Is singular causation best understood within a dispositionalist framework? Although a positive answer has not yet been wholly developed, different philosophers have made some positive contributions suggesting that it is. Against these suggestions, I claim that any possible account of singular causation in terms of real, irreducible, dispositions conveys unsolvable flaws in its very metaphysical foundations.

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M. J. Garcia-Encinas
University of Granada

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