Is logicist cognitive science possible?

Mind and Language 8 (1):49-71 (1993)

Abstract

This paper argues against Oaksford and Chater's claim that logicist cognitive science is not possible. It suggests that there arguments against logicist cognitive science are too closely tied to the account of Pylyshyn and of Fodor, and that the correct way of thinking about logicist cognitive science is in a mental models framework.

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Alan Garnham
University of Sussex