Abstract

ABSTRACTSome eco-philosophers argue that our responsibilities to the natural world are only indirect, that the responsibility to preserve nature or resources, for example, is best understood with respect to the responsibilities that we owe to other humans. Anthropocentric ethics holds that only human beings have moral value. Thus, although we may be said to have responsibilities regarding the natural world, we do not have direct responsibilities to the natural world. As a reaction to anthropocentrism, other eco-philosophers disagree, however, saying that we have direct responsibilities to natural objects other than human beings. Non-anthropocentric ethics grants moral standing to such natural objects as animals, plants and landscapes. Non-anthropocentrism requires an extension and revision of standard ethical principles. My main point in this article is twofold. First, I want to show that there is a serious flaw in anthropocentrism; my argument is that most anthropocentric approaches are based on either a particular scientific and reductionist worldview or a constructivist worldview, neither of which is adequate. Hence the anthropocentrism that follows from these worldviews is inadequate too. Secondly, I claim that most non-anthropocentric approaches are also inadequate in the sense that they are based on anthropocentrism at arm’s length or a disguised anthropocentrism; that is, they are equally scientistic and reductionist, even if by different means. By tracing Bhaskar’s philosophy from basic critical realism to dialectical critical realism and metaReality, relying specifically on Seo MinGyu’s interpretation, I will develop an alternative critical realist non-anthropism and anti-reductionism. By then engaging with Terrence Deacon’s contrasting dynamic systems perspective, which I take to be in line with Bhaskar’s thought, I want to show what is wrong with existing anthropocentric and non-anthropocentric approaches.