Shared and Social Discourse

Topoi 39 (3):587-595 (2020)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

On the premise that people achieve knowledge of things by sharing mental resources, what are the scope and philosophical significance of acts of shared intentionality in social discourse? Some philosophers and scientists of social cognition, most notably Jane Heal and Michael Tomasello, have drawn upon insights about the capacity of individual people to share mental resources and contents to argue for the importance of sociality in shaping mental activity. In this paper, I synthetize these strands of research with the aim of comparing different claims about shared intentionality, and facilitate an assessment in the debate on the social aspects of self and mentality.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 90,593

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Shared and Social Discourse.Mattia Gallotti - 2019 - Topoi 38 (tbc):1-9.
Why not the first-person plural in social cognition?Mattia Gallotti - 2013 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 36 (4):422-423.
Why Not the First-Person Plural in Social Cognition?Mattia Gallotti - 2013 - Behavioural and Brain Sciences 36 (4):422-423.
Alignment in social interactions.Mattia Gallotti, M. T. Fairhurst & C. D. Frith - 2017 - Consciousness and Cognition 48:253-261.
Shared intentions without a self.Michael Lewis - 2005 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 28 (5):707-708.
Joint Intentionality: From Thin to Thick.Koreň Ladislav - 2016 - Journal of Social Ontology 2 (1):75-85.
Tension in the Natural History of Human Thinking.Moll Henrike - 2016 - Journal of Social Ontology 2 (1):65-73.
The role of roles in uniquely human cognition and sociality.Michael Tomasello - 2020 - Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 50 (1):2-19.

Analytics

Added to PP
2020-06-06

Downloads
12 (#929,405)

6 months
3 (#445,838)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Mattia Gallotti
London School of Economics

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

Individualism and the mental.Tyler Burge - 1979 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 4 (1):73-122.
The Bounds of Cognition.Frederick Adams & Kenneth Aizawa - 2008 - Malden, MA, USA: Wiley-Blackwell. Edited by Kenneth Aizawa.
Individualism and the Mental.Tyler Burge - 1979 - In John Heil (ed.), Philosophy of Mind: A Guide and Anthology. Oxford University Press.

View all 24 references / Add more references