Topoi 38 (tbc):1-9 (2019)

Authors
Mattia Gallotti
London School of Economics
Abstract
On the premise that people achieve knowledge of things by sharing mental resources, what are the scope and philosophical significance of acts of shared intentionality in social discourse? Some philosophers and scientists of social cognition, most notably Jane Heal and Michael Tomasello, have drawn upon insights about the capacity of individual people to share mental resources and contents to argue for the importance of sociality in shaping mental activity. In this paper, I synthetize these strands of research with the aim of comparing different claims about shared intentionality, and facilitate an assessment in the debate on the social aspects of self and mentality.
Keywords Co-cognition  Jane Heal  Shared Intentionality Hypothesis  Michael Tomasello  We-intentionality
Categories (categorize this paper)
Reprint years 2019
DOI 10.1007/s11245-019-09633-w
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 70,130
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Individualism and the Mental.Tyler Burge - 1979 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 4 (1):73-122.
The Bounds of Cognition.Frederick Adams & Kenneth Aizawa - 2008 - Malden, MA, USA: Wiley-Blackwell.
Individualism and the Mental.Tyler Burge - 2003 - In John Heil (ed.), Philosophy of Mind: A Guide and Anthology. Oxford University Press.

View all 24 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Why Not the First-Person Plural in Social Cognition?Mattia Gallotti - 2013 - Behavioural and Brain Sciences 36 (4):422-423.
Alignment in Social Interactions.Mattia Gallotti, M. T. Fairhurst & C. D. Frith - 2017 - Consciousness and Cognition 48:253-261.
Shared Intentions Without a Self.Michael Lewis - 2005 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 28 (5):707-708.
Joint Intentionality: From Thin to Thick.Koreň Ladislav - 2016 - Journal of Social Ontology 2 (1):75-85.
Tension in the Natural History of Human Thinking.Moll Henrike - 2016 - Journal of Social Ontology 2 (1):65-73.
Shared Agency in Modest Sociality.Kirk Ludwig - 2015 - Journal of Social Ontology 1 (1):7-15.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2019-01-21

Total views
17 ( #636,073 of 2,506,489 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
1 ( #416,791 of 2,506,489 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes