Trends in Cognitive Sciences 4 (1):14-21 (2000)
Authors |
|
Abstract |
Although philosophical approaches to the self are diverse, several of them are relevant to cognitive science. First, the notion of a 'minimal self', a self devoid of temporal extension, is clarified by distinguishing between a sense of agency and a sense of ownership for action. To the extent that these senses are subject to failure in pathologies like schizophrenia, a neuropsychological model of schizophrenia may help to clarify the nature of the minimal self and its neurological underpinnings. Second, there is good evidence to suggest that although certain aspects of the minimal self are primitive and embodied, other aspects may be accessed only in reflective consciousness. Employing a modified concept of the minimal self, it may be possible to construct a robotic form of non-conscious self-reference that depends on an interaction between the robotic body and its environment. In contrast to the minimal self, the narrative self involves continuity over time and is directly relevant to discussions of memory and personal identity. There is growing consensus among philosophers and cognitive scientists about the importance of narrative and its relation to episodic memory and left-hemisphere functions. There are, however, at least two different views of how the narrative self is structured. On one model it is nothing more than an abstract point. On a more extended view, proposed here, the self is a rich amalgam of narratives that allows for the equivocations, contradictions, and self-deceptions of personal life. Even in this case, however, neurocognitive models contribute to our understanding of how narrative identity is structured
|
Keywords | Agency Narrative Ownership Schizophrenia Self Self-consciousness |
Categories | (categorize this paper) |
DOI | 10.1016/s1364-6613(99)01417-5 |
Options |
![]() ![]() ![]() ![]() |
Download options
References found in this work BETA
The Representing Brain: Neural Correlates of Motor Intention and Imagery.Marc Jeannerod - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (2):187-202.
Schizophrenia, the Space of Reasons, and Thinking as a Motor Process.John Campbell - 1999 - The Monist 82 (4):609-625.
Looking for the Agent: An Investigation Into Consciousness of Action and Self-Consciousness in Schizophrenic Patients.E. Daprati, N. Franck, N. Georgieff, Joëlle Proust, Elisabeth Pacherie, J. Dalery & Marc Jeannerod - 1997 - Cognition 65 (1):71-86.
View all 23 references / Add more references
Citations of this work BETA
From Cognitivism to Autopoiesis: Towards a Computational Framework for the Embodied Mind.Micah Allen & Karl J. Friston - 2018 - Synthese 195 (6):2459-2482.
Beyond the Comparator Model: A Multi-Factorial Two-Step Account of Agency.Matthis Synofzik, Gottfried Vosgerau & Albert Newen - 2008 - Consciousness and Cognition 17 (1):219-239.
Looking for the Self: Phenomenology, Neurophysiology and Philosophical Significance of Drug-Induced Ego Dissolution.Raphaël Millière - 2017 - Frontiers in Human Neuroscience 11:1-22.
View all 395 citations / Add more citations
Similar books and articles
Phenomenological Approaches to Consciousness.Shaun Gallagher - 2007 - In Max Velmans & Susan Schneider (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness. Blackwell. pp. 686--696.
Reconstructing the Minimal Self, or How to Make Sense of Agency and Ownership.Sanneke de Haan & Leon de Bruin - 2010 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 9 (3):373-396.
Naked Subjectivity: Minimal Vs. Narrative Selves in Kierkegaard.Patrick Stokes - 2010 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 53 (4):356-382.
Narrative Identity, Practical Identity and Ethical Subjectivity.Kim Atkins - 2004 - Continental Philosophy Review 37 (3):341-366.
The Sense of Self in the Phenomenology of Agency and Perception.Jakob Hohwy - 2007 - PSYCHE: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Research On Consciousness 13.
Personal Identity and Self as Narrative : Formal Identity and Narrative Identity as Two Essential Building Blocks in the Constitution of Self.Gerard P. Montague - unknown
Comment: The Minimal Self is a Social Self. de Haan - 2010 - In Thomas Fuchs, Heribert Sattel & Peter Henningsen (eds.), The embodied self: dimensions, coherence, disorders. Schattauer.
Analytics
Added to PP index
2009-01-28
Total views
749 ( #9,823 of 2,506,511 )
Recent downloads (6 months)
27 ( #33,328 of 2,506,511 )
2009-01-28
Total views
749 ( #9,823 of 2,506,511 )
Recent downloads (6 months)
27 ( #33,328 of 2,506,511 )
How can I increase my downloads?
Downloads