Trends in Cognitive Sciences 4 (1):14-21 (2000)

Shaun Gallagher
University of Memphis
Although philosophical approaches to the self are diverse, several of them are relevant to cognitive science. First, the notion of a 'minimal self', a self devoid of temporal extension, is clarified by distinguishing between a sense of agency and a sense of ownership for action. To the extent that these senses are subject to failure in pathologies like schizophrenia, a neuropsychological model of schizophrenia may help to clarify the nature of the minimal self and its neurological underpinnings. Second, there is good evidence to suggest that although certain aspects of the minimal self are primitive and embodied, other aspects may be accessed only in reflective consciousness. Employing a modified concept of the minimal self, it may be possible to construct a robotic form of non-conscious self-reference that depends on an interaction between the robotic body and its environment. In contrast to the minimal self, the narrative self involves continuity over time and is directly relevant to discussions of memory and personal identity. There is growing consensus among philosophers and cognitive scientists about the importance of narrative and its relation to episodic memory and left-hemisphere functions. There are, however, at least two different views of how the narrative self is structured. On one model it is nothing more than an abstract point. On a more extended view, proposed here, the self is a rich amalgam of narratives that allows for the equivocations, contradictions, and self-deceptions of personal life. Even in this case, however, neurocognitive models contribute to our understanding of how narrative identity is structured
Keywords Agency   Narrative   Ownership   Schizophrenia   Self   Self-consciousness
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DOI 10.1016/s1364-6613(99)01417-5
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References found in this work BETA

Five Kinds of Self-Knowledge.Ulric Neisser - 1988 - Philosophical Psychology 1 (1):35 – 59.
‘The Self’.Galen Strawson - 1997 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 4 (5-6):405-428.

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What Memory Is.Stan Klein - 2015 - WIREs Cognitive Science 6 (1):1-38.
Varieties of the Extended Self.Richard Heersmink - 2020 - Consciousness and Cognition 85:103001.

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