Kordig's paradox objection to radical meaning variance theories

Philosophy of Science 50 (3):494-497 (1983)
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Abstract

In his book, The Justification of Scientific Change, Carl Kordig claims that the radical meaning variance view of Feyerabend and others becomes ensnared in a self-referential paradox. The accusation fails because it rests upon a confusion of that view with its "counterparts" in other linguistic/theoretical contexts

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