Constructivism for philosophers (be it a remark on realism)

Perspectives on Science 10 (4):523-549 (2002)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

: Bereft of the illusion of an epistemic vantage point external to science, what should be our commitment towards the categories, concepts and terms of that very science? Should we, despaired of the possibility to found these concepts on rock bottom, adopt empiricist skepticism? Or perhaps the inexistence of external foundations implies, rather, immunity for scientific ontology from epistemological criticism? Philosophy's "realism debate" died out without providing a satisfactory answer to the dilemma, which was taken over by the neighboring disciplines. The "symmetry principle" of the "StrongProgramme" for the sociology of science-the requirement that truth and error receive the same kind of causal explanations-offered one bold metaphysical answer, under the guise of a methodological decree. Recently, however, it has been argued that this solution is not bold enough, that the social constructivists replaced the naïve presumption of an independent nature which adjudicates our beliefs with a mirror-image presumption of a sui generis society which furnishes these beliefs autonomously. The proper metaphysics for a foundationless epistemology, argues Bruno Latour, is one which grants nature and society, object and subject, equal roles in the success and failure of science and technology; one in which history of society merges with a history of things-in-themselves. The paper analyzes the philosophical and methodological motivations and ramifications of this extraordinary suggestion

Other Versions

No versions found

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 101,505

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Antirealist explanations of the success of science.Andre Kukla - 1996 - Philosophy of Science 63 (3):305.
The Ontology of Time in Metaphysics and Philosophy of Science.Vadim N. Zima - 2018 - Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy 62:163-167.
Are you a selective-realist dialetheist without knowing it?María del Rosario Martinez-Ordaz - 2019 - Revista Colombiana de Filosofía de la Ciencia 19 (38).
Axiological Scientific Realism and Methodological Prescription.Timothy D. Lyons - 2011 - In Henk W. De Regt, Stephan Hartmann & Samir Okasha (eds.), EPSA Philosophy of Science: Amsterdam 2009. Springer. pp. 187--197.
Realism, Progress and the Historical Turn.Howard Sankey - 2017 - Foundations of Science 22 (1):201-214.
On truth and reference in postmodern science.Emma Ruttkamp - 2003 - South African Journal of Philosophy 22 (3):220-235.
Kuhn, the correspondence theory of truth and coherentist epistemology.Jouni-Matti Kuukkanen - 2007 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 38 (3):555-566.

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
65 (#326,512)

6 months
12 (#301,340)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Ofer Gal
University of Sydney

References found in this work

Philosophical Investigations.Ludwig Wittgenstein - 1953 - New York, NY, USA: Wiley-Blackwell. Edited by G. E. M. Anscombe.
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature.Richard Rorty - 1979 - Princeton University Press.
We have never been modern.Bruno Latour - 1993 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
The social construction of what?Ian Hacking - 1999 - Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press.
Empiricism and the philosophy of mind.Wilfrid Sellars - 1956 - Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 1:253-329.

View all 49 references / Add more references