Spinoza et le probleme de l'akrasia: Un aspect neglige de l'ordo geometricus

Philosophiques 29 (1):57--71 (2002)
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Abstract

The question of the weakness of the will, traditionally named akrasia after Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics (Book III), is tackled in part 4 of Spinoza’s Ethics. After a brief presentation of this problematic in the Ethics, the author shows how the geometrical order chosen by Spinoza to write his book constitutes a great part of the strategy put in place to concretely resolve this question

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