Amplifying phenomenal information: Toward a fundamental theory of consciousness

Journal of Consciousness Studies 9 (8):3-29 (2002)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

from non-conscious components by positing that consciousness is a universal primitive. For example, the double aspect theory of information holds that infor- mation has a phenomenal aspect. How then do you get from phenomenal infor- mation to human consciousness? This paper proposes that an entity is conscious to the extent it amplifies information, first by trapping and integrating it through closure, and second by maintaining dynamics at the edge of chaos through simul- taneous processes of divergence and convergence. The origin of life through autocatalytic closure, and the origin of an interconnected worldview through conceptual closure, induced phase transitions in the degree to which informa- tion, and thus consciousness, is locally amplified. Divergence and convergence of cognitive information may involve phenomena observed in light e.g. focusing, interference, and resonance. By making information flow inward- biased, clo- sure shields us from external consciousness; thus the paucity of consciousness may be an illusion.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 91,164

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Neural activation, information, and phenomenal consciousness.Max Velmans - 1999 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (1):172-173.
On a confusion about a function of consciousness.Ned Block - 1995 - Brain and Behavioral Sciences 18 (2):227-–247.
A limited defense of phenomenal information.William G. Lycan - 1995 - In Thomas Metzinger (ed.), Conscious Experience. Imprint Academic. pp. 243--58.
Phenomenal consciousness and intentionality.Dana K. Nelkin - 2001 - PSYCHE: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Research On Consciousness 7.

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
318 (#60,428)

6 months
14 (#151,397)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Citations of this work

The Combination Problem for Panpsychism.David Chalmers - 2017 - In Brüntrup Godehard & Jaskolla Ludwig (eds.), Panpsychism. Oxford University Press.
Ideas are not replicators but minds are.Liane Gabora - 2004 - Biology and Philosophy 19 (1):127-143.
Consciousness reassessed.Karl H. Pribram - 2004 - Mind and Matter 2 (1):7-35.

Add more citations

References found in this work

Mortal questions.Thomas Nagel - 1979 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
Consciousness Explained.Daniel C. Dennett - 1993 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 53 (4):905-910.

View all 73 references / Add more references