Social Theory and Practice 39 (3):477-500 (2013)

Authors
Dwight Furrow
University of California, Riverside
Mark Wheeler
San Diego State University
Abstract
Contrary to hierarchical/procedural models of autonomous action, according to which reflective self-appraisal is essential to autonomous action, we argue that autonomous action essentially involves the way agents take up and respond to the normative demands of objects of care. To be autonomous, an action must track the genuine needs of some object the agent cares about. Thus, autonomous action is essentially teleological, governed by both an agent’s concerns and the object of care. It is not dependent only on the will, understood as an internal efficient causal force, and is robustly relational in a constitutive sense.
Keywords Applied Philosophy  Social and Political Philosophy
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ISBN(s) 0037-802X
DOI soctheorpract201339326
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References found in this work BETA

Control: Conscious and Otherwise.Christopher L. Suhler & Patricia S. Churchland - 2009 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 13 (8):341-347.
Autonomy, History, and the Subject of Justice.John Christman - 2007 - Social Theory and Practice 33 (1):1-26.
Autonomy, History, and the Subject of Justice.John Christman - 2007 - Social Theory and Practice 33 (1):1-26.

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