The determinable-determinate relation

Noûs 40 (3):548–569 (2006)
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Abstract

The properties colored and red stand in a special relation. Namely, red is a determinate of colored, and colored is determinable relative to red. Many other properties are similarly related. The determination relation is an interesting topic of logical investigation in its own right, and the prominent philosophical inquiries into this relation have, accordingly, operated at a high level of abstraction.1 It is time to return to these investigations, not just as a logical amusement, but for the payoffs such investigation can yield in solving some basic metaphysical problems. The goal in what follows is twofold. First, I argue for a novel understanding of the determination relation. Second, this understanding is applied to yield insights into property instance (e.g., trope) individuation, how different property types can share an instance, the relation between property types and property instances, as well as applications to causation (mental causation, in particular).

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Eric Funkhouser
University of Arkansas, Fayetteville

Citations of this work

Construction area (no hard hat required).Karen Bennett - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 154 (1):79-104.
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A determinable-based account of metaphysical indeterminacy.Jessica M. Wilson - 2013 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 56 (4):359-385.
Attention and perceptual content.Bence Nanay - 2010 - Analysis 70 (2):263-270.

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