What are the COVID-19 models modeling (philosophically speaking)?

History and Philosophy of the Life Sciences 43 (2):1-5 (2021)
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Abstract

COVID-19 epidemic models raise important questions for science and philosophy of science. Here I provide a brief preliminary exploration of three: what kinds of predictions do epidemic models make, are they causal models, and how do different kinds of epidemic models differ in terms of what they represent?

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References found in this work

The Non-mechanistic Option: Defending Dynamical Explanations.Russell Meyer - 2018 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 71 (3):959-985.
Epidemics from the Population Perspective.Jonathan Fuller - 2022 - Philosophy of Science 89 (2):232-251.

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