Implications of a logical paradox for computer-dispensed justice reconsidered: some key differences between minds and machines

Artificial Intelligence and Law 20 (3):321-333 (2012)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

We argued [Since this argument appeared in other journals, I am reprising it here, almost verbatim.] (Fulda in J Law Info Sci 2:230–232, 1991/AI & Soc 8(4):357–359, 1994) that the paradox of the preface suggests a reason why machines cannot, will not, and should not be allowed to judge criminal cases. The argument merely shows that they cannot now and will not soon or easily be so allowed. The author, in fact, now believes that when—and only when—they are ready they actually should be so allowed, in the interests of justice. Both the original argument applied and this detailed reconsideration applies exclusively to trial courts, and both specifically exclude(d) sentencing. The argument highlights some key relevant differences between minds and machines and attempts, also, to explain why automation is of far greater import for the first-level justice system (trial courts) than for higher courts. A final section discusses why sentencing was, is, and should be excluded.

Similar books and articles

Analytics

Added to PP
2011-05-04

Downloads
122 (#142,362)

6 months
15 (#140,820)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

The paradox of the preface.David C. Makinson - 1965 - Analysis 25 (6):205-207.
``The Paradox of the Preface".D. C. Makinson - 1964 - Analysis 25 (6):205-207.
What is the Normative Role of Logic?Peter Milne - 2009 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 83 (1):269-298.
II—Peter Milne: What is the Normative Role of Logic?Peter Milne - 2009 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 83 (1):269-298.

View all 12 references / Add more references