The costs and benefits of a separation of powers - an incomplete contracts approach

Abstract

The separation of the legislative, executive and judiciary powers is a key principle in most democratic constitutions. We analyze the costs and benefits of separating legislature and executive in an incomplete contracts model: The executive can decide to implement public projects. Under separation of powers, the legislature sets up a decision-making framework that leaves the executive with the residual decision-making rights. Separation of powers is the more beneficial, the larger the danger of extreme policy preferences of the residual political decision-maker.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 90,593

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

  • Only published works are available at libraries.

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-05-17

Downloads
14 (#846,545)

6 months
1 (#1,040,386)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references