Philosophical Studies 172 (8):2171-2191 (2015)

Authors
Erin Frykholm
University of Kansas
Abstract
Virtue ethical theories typically follow a neo-Aristotelian or quasi-Aristotelian model, making use of various combinations of key features of the Aristotelian model including eudaimonism, perfectionism, an account of practical wisdom, and the thesis of the unity of the virtues. In this paper I motivate what I call a Humean virtue ethic, which is a deeply particularist account of virtue that rejects all of these central tenets, at least in their traditional forms. Focusing on three factors by which Hume determines virtue, I show that this view of virtue resonates with the aims of the moral particularist, who holds that there are no general moral principles and that right action is determined only with reference to context and on a case-by-case basis. I use Hume’s texts to introduce and motivate three claims, which I find plausible, and which I will show can be read together as entailing an interesting and underappreciated picture of virtue that is also able to solve an important dilemma for particularist virtue ethics.
Keywords Particularism  Virtue  Hume
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DOI 10.1007/s11098-014-0404-y
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References found in this work BETA

Ethics Without Principles.Jonathan Dancy - 2004 - Oxford University Press.
The Sovereignty of Good.Iris Murdoch - 1970 - New York: Schocken Books.
Morals From Motives.Michael A. Slote - 2001 - Oxford University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

Associative Virtues and Hume's Narrow Circle.Erin Frykholm - 2017 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 98 (1):612-637.
Associative Virtues and Hume's Narrow Circle.Erin Frykholm - 2016 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 97 (4):612-637.

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