Moral Heroism and the Requirement Claim

Southwest Philosophy Review 30 (1):93-104 (2014)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Acts of moral heroism are often described by heroes as having been in some sense or another required. Here I elaborate two rival strategies for accounting for what I call the requirement claim. The first, originating with J.O. Urmson, attempts to explain away the phenomenon. The second and more popular among moralists is to treat the requirement claim as a moment of moral insight and to make sense of it in terms of moral duty. I argue that both of these strategies are flawed, in that both fail as an account of the phenomenon in question and are independently problematic. I propose a third, alternative account of the requirement claim based on the concept of practical necessity, which, I argue, avoids the pitfalls of the other views.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 92,323

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Moral Dilemmas and Incomparability.Walter Sinnott-Armstrong - 1985 - American Philosophical Quarterly 22 (4):321 - 329.
What is Wrong With Moral Testimony?Robert Hopkins - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74 (3):611-634.
How Much for the Child?Christian Barry & Gerhard Øverland - 2013 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 16 (1):189-204.
On sacrificial heroism.Adam Lankford - 2013 - Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 16 (5):634-654.
The conversational practicality of value judgement.Stephen Finlay - 2004 - The Journal of Ethics 8 (3):205-223.
Autonomy, understanding, and moral disagreement.C. Thi Nguyen - 2010 - Philosophical Topics 38 (2):111-129.
Why Common Sense Morality is Not Collectively Self-Defeating.Peter Boltuc - 2007 - Polish Journal of Philosophy 1 (2):17-26.
Why Common Sense Morality is Not Collectively Self-Defeating.Piotr Bołtuć - 2007 - Polish Journal of Philosophy 1 (2):19-39.
The Relevance of Trust for Moral Justification.Theresa Weynand Tobin - 2011 - Social Theory and Practice 37 (4):599-628.

Analytics

Added to PP
2015-01-22

Downloads
73 (#227,238)

6 months
5 (#648,315)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Kyle Fruh
Duke Kunshan University

Citations of this work

Supererogation.Alfred Archer - 2018 - Philosophy Compass 13 (3):e12476.

Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references