The Myth of Irrationality: A Wittgensteinian Approach to Delusions and to the Principle of Charity

In Maxime Amblard, Michel Musiol & Manuel Rebuschi (eds.), (In)Coherence of Discourse: Formal and Conceptual Issues of Language. Dordrecht: Springer Verlag. pp. 131-151 (2021)
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Abstract

The principle of charity is most often understood as that which justifies ascribing rationality to every interlocutor, regardless of the agent appears irrational. As such, a recurring question in the field of the philosophy of psychiatry is whether the said principle should be advocated as a way of understanding delusions as rational or should be rejected as a form of over-rationalization. The aim of this paper is to show, by defending an understanding of rationality inspired by the late philosophy of Wittgenstein, that this debate relies mainly on a misconception of the said principle. Indeed, charity does not consist in making the mere hypothesis that every agent is rational, but more simply in acknowledging that rationality is the condition of every form of understanding. As such, the question we should be asking is not so much whether delusions are rational or not, but rather in what sense can speech be judged as irrational within our own norms of rationality.

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Mathieu Frerejouan
Université paris 1

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Certainty and delusion.Rick Bellaar - 2022 - Philosophical Psychology 36 (7):1–25.

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