What Could a Two-Way Power Be?

Topoi 39 (5):1141-1153 (2020)
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Abstract

Alvarez and Steward think the power of agency is a two-way power; Lowe thinks the will is. There is a problem for two-way powers. Either there is a unified description of the manifestation-type of the power, or not. If so, two-way powers are really one-way powers. If not, two-way powers are really combinations of one-way powers. Either way, two-way powers cannot help distinguish free agents from everything else. I argue the problem is best avoided by an Aristotelian view, which posits a distinctive unity of explanation proper to two-way powers, grounded in a distinctive form of reasoning.

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Kim Frost
University of California, Riverside

Citations of this work

Agency as a Two-Way Power: A Defence.Helen Steward - 2020 - The Monist 103 (3):342-355.
Agentive Duality reconsidered.Annina Loets & Julia Zakkou - 2022 - Philosophical Studies 179 (12):3771-3789.
Failure and Success in Agency.David Heering - 2024 - Philosophical Quarterly 74 (2):590-613.
Mind-Body Parallelism and Spinoza's Philosophy of Mind.Ruben Noorloos - 2022 - Dissertation, Central European University

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References found in this work

A Metaphysics for Freedom.Helen Steward - 2012 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
Action, Knowledge, and Will.John Hyman - 2015 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
Sources of Knowledge: On the Concept of a Rational Capacity for Knowledge.Andrea Kern - 2016 - Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press.
Perception as a Capacity for Knowledge.John Mcdowell - 2011 - Marquette University Press.

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