The Ethics of Role-Playing Video Games

Abstract

In this project, I explore the ethics of interactive role-playing video games. After explicating a wide range of issues contained in these games, I argue that they belong in the realm of fiction. Using the theory of Response Moralism, I argue that the emotions we feel in response to fictions, which includes role-playing games, are real and morally assessable. I then present an attack on escapism, which I challenge by arguing that evincing virtues and vices is possible within a video game or virtual reality. I end my project with a discussion of the ways in which race and gender are represented in video games, alongside an applied case of response moralism. I make the conclusion that role-playing video games are morally significant works, which are worthy of philosophical attention

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References found in this work

Utterer’s Meaning and Intentions.H. Paul Grice - 1969 - Philosophical Review 78 (2):147-177.
Emotions and the category of passivity.R. S. Peters & C. A. Mace - 1962 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 62:117-142.
How to defend response moralism.Allan Hazlett - 2009 - British Journal of Aesthetics 49 (3):241-255.
Imagining Emotions and Appreciating Fiction.Susan L. Feagin - 1988 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 18 (3):485 - 500.

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