Abstract

The ultimate aim of this dissertation is to account for St. Thomas's doctrine of the primacy of the common good in the light of what he says about friendship, particularly in his commentary on the eighth and ninth book of the Nicomachean Ethics. ;Two difficulties serve to focus the argument. First, how can the common good be, as Thomas argues, the highest good in human affairs, if happiness is, as he says, a purely personal good? In other words, how can a common good be a principal constituent of a private good? It seems contradictory. Second, a good that belongs primarily to the multitude and secondarily to the individual seems less of a good for the individual than, say, his personal virtues. The common good does not belong to him in his individuality and hence appears almost not to be his own, even though it is indispensable for his happiness. To prefer it above his personal good would be enslavement. ;These are problems which, I think, lurk behind recent writers' striking neglect of St. Thomas's ubiquitous claim that the common good holds sway over the purely private good. My argument is that if we see first how the common good present in friendship can be a culmination of virtuous activity, a pinnacle of happiness, then we will see our way clear of these difficulties in relation to the political common good