Recursionist Theories of Knowledge (6th edition)

Abstract

A recursive definition of knowledge is proposed, to deal with Gettier style difficulties, and provide a framework for a variety of recursionist theories of knowledge.

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Frode Alfson Bjørdal
University of Oslo

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Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?Edmund Gettier - 1963 - Analysis 23 (6):121-123.

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