Abstract

After having shown that time is neither identical with nor set apart from change, Aristotle concludes that time is some aspect of change. Following this, he sets forth two definitions. Time is “that which is determined [on both sides] by the now”. A few lines later, one finds what has usually been taken to be the binding, or even the only, definition of time: “a number of motion in respect to the before and after ”, with the subsequent explanation that ‘number’ here does not mean the number with which we count, but rather the number being counted or the countable number. Over the long history of commentary and interpretation, there have been several controversial points concerning these definitions, three of which I shall discuss in this paper. For Aristotle, number is a discrete quantum. Motion, on the other hand, and along with it time, are continuous quantities. How, then, can we think discreteness and continuity as united in time? Furthermore, what does ‘number’ mean, and what is the cause of that specific number which time is? Aristotle says that time as some motion or change is only within the changing thing itself, yet time is equally everywhere and with everything. How, then, can it be thought that there are, in fact, many different changes, but of all these changes only one time?