Pragmatic Encroachment and Moral Encroachment

Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 98 (S1):643-661 (2017)
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Abstract

Subject-sensitive invariantism posits surprising connections between a person’s knowledge and features of her environment that are not paradigmatically epistemic features. But which features of a person’s environment have this distinctive connection to knowledge? Traditional defenses of subject-sensitive invariantism emphasize features that matter to the subject of the knowledge-attribution. Call this pragmatic encroachment. A more radical thesis usually goes ignored: knowledge is sensitive to moral facts, whether or not those moral facts matter to the subject. Call this moral encroachment. This paper argues that, insofar as there are good arguments for pragmatic encroachment, there are also good arguments for moral encroachment.

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Author's Profile

James Fritz
Virginia Commonwealth University

References found in this work

Knowledge and practical interests.Jason Stanley - 2005 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Knowledge in an uncertain world.Jeremy Fantl & Matthew McGrath - 2009 - New York: Oxford University Press. Edited by Matthew McGrath.
Knowledge and Action.John Hawthorne & Jason Stanley - 2008 - Journal of Philosophy 105 (10):571-590.
Knowledge and Lotteries.John Hawthorne - 2005 - Philosophical Quarterly 55 (219):353-356.
Knowledge and Practical Interests.Jason Stanley - 2006 - Critica 38 (114):98-107.

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