Norms, Constitutive and Social, and Assertion

American Philosophical Quarterly 54 (4):397-418 (2017)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

I define a social norm as a regularity in behavior whose persistence is causally explained by the existence of sanctioning attitudes of participants toward violations—without these sanctions, individuals have motive to violate the norm. I show how a universal precept "When in circumstances S, do action F" can be sustained by the conditional preference of each to conform, given that others do, of a convention, and also reinforced by the sanctions of a norm. I observe that a precept with moral force can be reinforced by a social norm. I then consider constitutive norms and show by means of an example, competitive figure skating, how a type of activity or practice G can have a constitutive norm NG. An ongoing activity in a community is engagement in that practice only if NG is reinforced as a social norm by participants. I apply this to the case of assertion: the speech act type Assertion has a constitutive norm NA, and a practice of making speech acts in a community is one of making assertions only if it is controlled by NA enforced by the sanctions of a social norm.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 94,549

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

What Norm of Assertion?Casey Rebecca Johnson - 2018 - Acta Analytica 33 (1):51-67.
Testimony and the Constitutive Norm of Assertion.Casey Rebecca Johnson - 2015 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 23 (3):356-375.
Norms of assertion.Graham Oppy - 2007 - In Dirk Greimann & Geo Siegwart (eds.), Truth and Speech Acts: Studies in the Philosophy of Language. London: Routledge. pp. 5--226.
No norm for (off the record) implicatures.Javier González de Prado - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.
Commitment Accounts of Assertion.Lionel Shapiro - 2018 - In Sanford C. Goldberg (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Assertion. Oxford University Press.
The Epistemic Norm of Blame.D. Justin Coates - 2016 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 19 (2):457-473.

Analytics

Added to PP
2017-11-02

Downloads
127 (#144,032)

6 months
13 (#282,484)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Elizabeth Fricker
Oxford University

Citations of this work

How to Understand Rule-Constituted Kinds.Manuel García-Carpintero - 2021 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 13 (1):7-27.
The Function of Assertion and Social Norms.Peter Graham - 2018 - In Sanford C. Goldberg (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Assertion. Oxford University Press. pp. 727-748.
?!.Michael Schmitz - manuscript
No norm for (off the record) implicatures.Javier González de Prado - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.
Suits on Strategic Fouling.Miroslav Imbrišević - 2019 - Sport, Ethics and Philosophy 13 (3-4):307-317.

View all 11 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

How to do things with words.John Langshaw Austin - 1962 - Oxford [Eng.]: Clarendon Press. Edited by Marina Sbisá & J. O. Urmson.
Fact, Fiction, and Forecast.Nelson Goodman - 1973 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Convention: A Philosophical Study.David Kellogg Lewis - 1969 - Cambridge, MA, USA: Wiley-Blackwell.
Speech Acts: An Essay in the Philosophy of Language.William P. Alston - 1970 - Philosophical Quarterly 20 (79):172-179.

View all 17 references / Add more references