American Philosophical Quarterly 56 (1):43-56 (2019)
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Call the following claim Asymmetry: rationality often requires a more steadfast response to pure moral disagreement than it does to otherwise analogous non-moral disagreement. This paper briefly motivates Asymmetry and explores its implications for meta-ethics. Some philosophers have thought that anti-realists are better-placed than realists to explain Asymmetry because, if anti-realism is true, disagreement cannot provide evidence against the reliability of one's thinking about objective moral facts. This paper argues that this simple diagnosis fails to support otherwise plausible anti-realisms. It closes by discussing an alternative explanation for Asymmetry, which appeals to the moral importance of steadfastness.
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Keywords | Moral disagreement Epistemology of disagreement Moral realism Moral anti-realism Steadfastness |
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References found in this work BETA
Assessment Sensitivity: Relative Truth and its Applications.John MacFarlane - 2014 - Oxford University Press.
Epistemology of Disagreement: The Good News.David Christensen - 2007 - Philosophical Review 116 (2):187-217.
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Citations of this work BETA
Metatheories of Disagreement: Introduction.Péter Hartl & Ákos Gyarmathy - 2021 - Metaphilosophy 52 (3-4):337-347.
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