Modal Platonism: an Easy Way to Avoid Ontological Commitment to Abstract Entities

Journal of Philosophical Logic 34 (3):227-273 (2005)
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Abstract

Modal Platonism utilizes "weak" logical possibility, such that it is logically possible there are abstract entities, and logically possible there are none. Modal Platonism also utilizes a non-indexical actuality operator. Modal Platonism is the EASY WAY, neither reductionist nor eliminativist, but embracing the Platonistic language of abstract entities while eliminating ontological commitment to them. Statement of Modal Platonism. Any consistent statement B ontologically committed to abstract entities may be replaced by an empirically equivalent modalization, MOD(B), not so ontologically committed. This equivalence is provable using Modal/Actuality Logic S5@. Let MAX be a strong set theory with individuals. Then the following Schematic Bombshell Result (SBR) can be shown: MAX logically yields [T is true if and only if MOD(T) is true], for scientific theories T. The proof utilizes Stephen Neale's clever model-theoretic interpretation of Quantified Lewis S5, which I extend to S5@

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Citations of this work

Abstracta Are Causal.David Friedell - 2020 - Philosophia 48 (1):133-142.
Term limits revisited.Stephen Neale - 2008 - Philosophical Perspectives 22 (1):375-442.
Indispensability arguments and instrumental nominalism.Richard Pettigrew - 2012 - Review of Symbolic Logic 5 (4):687-709.
Putnam and the Indispensability of Mathematics.Otávio Bueno - 2013 - Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology 17 (2):217.

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References found in this work

Naming and Necessity: Lectures Given to the Princeton University Philosophy Colloquium.Saul A. Kripke - 1980 - Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Edited by Darragh Byrne & Max Kölbel.
Counterfactuals.David K. Lewis - 1973 - Malden, Mass.: Blackwell.
Science Without Numbers: A Defence of Nominalism.Hartry H. Field - 1980 - Princeton, NJ, USA: Princeton University Press.
Naming and Necessity.S. Kripke - 1972 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 45 (4):665-666.

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