Higher set theory

Abstract

Russell’s way out of his paradox via the impre-dicative theory of types has roughly the same logical power as Zermelo set theory - which supplanted it as a far more flexible and workable axiomatic foundation for mathematics. We discuss some new formalisms that are conceptually close to Russell, yet simpler, and have the same logical power as higher set theory - as represented by the far more powerful Zermelo-Frankel set theory and beyond. END.

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2009-01-28

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Citations of this work

Intermediate Logics and the de Jongh property.Dick de Jongh, Rineke Verbrugge & Albert Visser - 2011 - Archive for Mathematical Logic 50 (1-2):197-213.
Platonistic formalism.L. Horsten - 2001 - Erkenntnis 54 (2):173-194.

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