Abstract

Both neokantian moral theorists and Kant scholars have begun to incorporate Kant's moral anthropology. The result has been kantian moral theory that pays attention to character, virtue, and the richness of human life, and that takes seriously Kant's own conception of the importance for ethics of moral anthropology. But there is an apparent conflict between Kant's anthropological insights into empirical helps and hindrances to developing moral character and his insistence that transcendental freedom is a condition of the possibility of moral responsibility. ;This problem was originally raised in Schleiermacher's review of Kant's published Anthropology, and hence I call it "Schleiermacher's dilemma." As Schleiermacher points out, Kant's account of freedom implies a fundamental priority of freedom. Free choices can be ultimate grounds of events in the world, but one cannot similarly consider events in the world ultimate grounds of choice. At the same time, Kant's anthropology is both empirical and morally significant. His anthropological accounts of politeness, emotions, and character are all accounts of empirical influences that help or hinder having a good will. ;Contemporary kantian moral theorists have not sufficiently addressed this tension. Some offer promising possibilities for moral anthropology, but either fail to recognize the full moral significance of empirical influences or sacrifice Kant's theory of freedom. My dissertation fills this gap. I reconcile Kant's moral anthropology to his theory of freedom by clearly articulating Kant's notion of a free will "in revolution" against evil. By making clear the relationship between this will and its appearance in the world, an appearance that takes the form of a struggle against evil, I argue that promoting empirical aids to moral "progress" expresses a good will. This preserves the priority of freedom over empirical influences without undermining the moral significance of those influences. I show how this "expression" model of moral anthropology applies to cases of interpersonal moral influence, and I show how far Kant can allow for such influence. Finally, I compare Kant's ethics with Schleiermacher's soft determinist moral theory to show both the limitations and the strengths of Kant's conception of moral anthropology