The Science of Measuring Pleasure and Pain

In Olof Pettersson & Vigdis Songe-Møller (eds.), Plato’s Protagoras: Essays on the Confrontation of Philosophy and Sophistry. Springer (2016)
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Abstract

Near the end of the Protagoras there is a famous argument in which Socrates appears to deny the possibility of weakness of will. The passage is part of a longer examination of whether virtue can be taught and of the unity of the virtues. Socrates and Protagoras discuss whether it makes sense to say, as people commonly do, that they sometimes choose to do things they know are not best for them because they are “overcome by pleasure.” Supposedly “the many” hold that the good is pleasure, and that one chooses what is less good because it is most pleasant. Socrates takes Protagoras through a kind of elenctic examination that purports to show that the many’s claim to being overcome by pleasure in akrasia is absurd or ridiculous. They can’t really do what they claim to do, choose the less good for the more good; thus, and the claim that they do is a misdescription of what really happens. People act in these cases due to ignorance of what is truly the most good. In order to prevent people from choosing things that are not best for them, or to save them, Socrates says that what is needed is an art or science of measurement. In this paper I want to focus on the idea of such an art or science of measurement.

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Cynthia Freeland
University of Houston

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