Dialogue 49 (1):73-89 (2010)

Karyn L. Freedman
University of Guelph
ABSTRACT: Looking at specific populations of knowers reveals that the presumption of sameness within knowledge communities can lead to a number of epistemological oversights. A good example of this is found in the case of survivors of sexual violence. In this paper I argue that this case study offers a new perspective on the debate between the epistemic internalist and externalist by providing us with a fresh insight into the complicated psychological dimensions of belief formation and the implications that this has for an epistemology that demands reasons that are first-person accessible. RÉSUMÉ: L’observation de populations spécifiques d’agents épistémiques révèle que la présomption d’identité au sein de communautés épistémiques peut mener à certaines omissions cognitives. Les victimes de violence sexuelle en sont un bon exemple. Cette étude de cas offre selon nous une nouvelle perspective sur le débat entre les internalistes et les externalistes en épistémologie en proposant une nouvelle perspective sur les dimensions psychologiques complexes dans la formation des croyances et sur leur implication dans une épistémologie qui nécessite que les raisons soient accessibles à la première personne.
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DOI 10.1017/S0012217310000041
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References found in this work BETA

The Principles of Psychology.William James - 1890 - London, England: Dover Publications.
Elements of Episodic Memory.Endel Tulving - 1983 - Oxford University Press.
What is Justified Belief?Alvin Goldman - 1979 - In George Pappas (ed.), Justification and Knowledge. Boston: D. Reidel. pp. 1-25.
Discrimination and Perceptual Knowledge.Alvin Goldman - 1976 - Journal of Philosophy 73 (November):771-791.

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Faith and Epistemology.Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa - 2020 - Episteme 17 (1):121-140.

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