Vinícius França Freitas
Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais (Alumnus)
The paper advances two hypotheses concerning Thomas Reid’s reading of George Berkeley’s immaterialist system. First, it is argued that, on Reid’s view, Berkeley is skeptic about the existence of the objects of the material world, not in virtue of a doubt about the senses but for his adoption of the principle that ideas are the immediate objects of the operations of mind. On Reid’s view, that principle is a skeptical principle by its own nature. Secondly, it is argued that Berkeley really accepts in his system the notion of ‘idea’ such as Reid understands it, namely, as an entity distinct from mind and its operations.
Keywords Contemporary Philosophy  History of Philosophy
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DOI 10.5840/philosophica202128571
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