Naive Realist Perspectives on Seeing Blurrily

In James Stazicker (ed.), The Structure of Perceptual Experience. Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 31–51 (2015)
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Naive realists hold that experience is to be understood in terms of an intimate perceptual relation between a subject and aspects of the world, relative to a certain standpoint. Those aspects of the world themselves shape the contours of consciousness. But blurriness is an aspect of some of our experiences that does not seem to come from the world. I argue that this constitutes a significant challenge to some forms of naive realism. But I also argue that there is a robust form of naive realism which is unfazed by the blurriness of some of our experiences, even when that blurriness is understood as a subjective modification of consciousness.



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Craig French
Nottingham University

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The Problem of Perception.Tim Crane & Craig French - 2021 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

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