Karyn L. Freedman
University of Guelph
It sometimes seems to us that our judgments about what we ought to believe diverge from what we in fact believe. I may be perfectly aware that I am not particularly risking my life by flying, for instance, and yet, as I tighten my seatbelt in preparation for takeoff, I may nevertheless embrace the seemingly paradoxical thought that I am likely to die in a matter of mere seconds. In moments like this, it can feel to us like we are experiencing a failure of rationality, as we seem to embrace a belief that we ourselves judge to be unreasonable. That is why philosophers have characterized these kinds of cases as akratic believing. Certainly, they leave us with that same funny feeling, that familiar dread that...
Keywords akrasia  rationality  recalcitrant emotions
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1353/ppp.2017.0052
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 70,163
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Moore's Paradox and Akratic Belief.Eugene Chislenko - 2016 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 92 (3):669-690.
Akratic Feelings.Alfred R. Mele - 1989 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 50 (2):277-288.
Akratic Believing, Psychological Trauma, and Somatic Representations.Karyn L. Freedman - 2017 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 24 (4):337-346.
Akratic Believing?Jonathan E. Adler - 2002 - Philosophical Studies 110 (1):1 - 27.
Rational Akrasia.John Brunero - 2013 - Organon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu 20 (4):546-566.
Emotions, Reasons, and Autonomy.Christine Tappolet - 2014 - In Andrea Veltman & Mark C. Piper (eds.), Autonomy, Oppression and Gender. Oxford University Press. pp. 163-180.
Incontinent Belief: A Rejoinder.Alfred R. Mele - 1991 - Journal of Philosophical Research 16:197-212.
Incontinent Belief: A Rejoinder.Alfred R. Mele - 1990 - Journal of Philosophical Research 16:197-212.
Self-Control and Akrasia.Christine Tappolet - forthcoming - In Meghan Griffith, Kevin Timpe & Neil Levy (eds.), Routledge Companion to Free Will. Routledge.
Epistemic Akrasia.David Owens - 2002 - The Monist 85 (3):381-397.
Epistemic Akrasia and Mental Agency.Cristina Borgoni - 2015 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 6 (4):827-842.
The Will as Practical Reason and the Problem of Akrasia.Daniel Guevara - 2009 - Review of Metaphysics 62 (3):525-550.


Added to PP index

Total views
19 ( #582,217 of 2,506,852 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
2 ( #277,244 of 2,506,852 )

How can I increase my downloads?


My notes