Why virtual friendship is no genuine friendship

Ethics and Information Technology 14 (3):201-207 (2012)
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Abstract

Based on a modern reading of Aristotle’s theory of friendship, we argue that virtual friendship does not qualify as genuine friendship. By ‘virtual friendship’ we mean the type of friendship that exists on the internet, and seldom or never is combined with real life interaction. A ‘traditional friendship’ is, in contrast, the type of friendship that involves substantial real life interaction, and we claim that only this type can merit the label ‘genuine friendship’ and thus qualify as morally valuable. The upshot of our discussion is that virtual friendship is what Aristotle might have described as a lower and less valuable form of social exchange.

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Martin Peterson
Texas A&M University

References found in this work

The Nicomachean Ethics.Aristotle . (ed.) - 1926 - New York, N.Y.: Oxford University Press UK.
The Fabric of Character: Aristotle's Theory of Virtue.Nancy Sherman - 1989 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
Unreal friends.Dean Cocking & Steve Matthews - 2000 - Ethics and Information Technology 2 (4):223-231.
Nicomachean Ethics: Books Viii and Ix.Michael Pakaluk (ed.) - 1998 - Oxford University Press UK.

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