Why do Scientists Prefer to Vary their Experiments?

Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 15 (1):51 (1984)
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References found in this work

Probability and Evidence.Paul Horwich - 1982 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 47 (4):687-688.
Bayesian Personalism, the Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes, and Duhem's Problem.Jon Dorling - 1979 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 10 (3):177.
A Bayesian Reconstruction of the Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes.M. L. G. Redhead - 1980 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 11 (4):341.
On the utility of repeating the 'same' experiment.Peter Urbach - 1981 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 59 (2):151 – 162.
The Discovery and Nondiscovery of Parity Nonconservation.Allan Franklin - 1979 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 10 (3):201.

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