The Non-Reductionist's Troubles with Supervenience

Philosophical Studies 89 (1):105-124 (1998)
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Abstract

I argue that there is a tension between three popular views in the philosophy of mind: (1) mental properties are not identical with physical properties (a version of nonreductionism), but (2) mental properties are had solely by virtue of physical properties (physicalism regarding the mind), which requires that (3) mental properties supervene on physical properties. To earn the title "physicalist," one must hold a sufficiently strong version of the supervenience thesis. But this, I argue, will be a version that undermines nonreductionism.

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Robert Francescotti
San Diego State University

Citations of this work

Nonreductive materialism I. introduction.Lynne Rudder Baker - 2009 - In Brian McLaughlin and Ansgar Beckermann (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mind. Oxford University Press.
Reduction and emergence: a critique of Kim.Paul Needham - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 146 (1):93-116.

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