Stove's discovery of the worst argument in the world

Philosophy 77 (4):615-624 (2002)
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Abstract

The winning entry in David Stove's Competition to Find the Worst Argument in the World was: “We can know things only as they are related to us/insofar as they fall under our conceptual schemes, etc., so, we cannot know things as they are in themselves.” That argument underpins many recent relativisms, including postmodernism, post-Kuhnian sociological philosophy of science, cultural relativism, sociobiological versions of ethical relativism, and so on. All such arguments have the same form as ‘We have eyes, therefore we cannot see’, and are equally invalid.

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Author's Profile

James Franklin
University of New South Wales

References found in this work

Models and reality.Hilary Putnam - 1980 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3):464-482.
Healthy Scepticism.James Franklin - 1991 - Philosophy 66 (257):305 - 324.
The social theory of truth.P. H. Partridge - 1936 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 14 (3):161 – 175.
The social theory of truth.P. H. Partridge - 1936 - Australasian Journal of Psychology and Philosophy 14 (3):161-175.

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