Revival of Objectivity in Scientific Method

Journal of Ayn Rand Studies 3 (1):29-46 (2001)
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Abstract

Doug Fraedrich reviews recent developments in the field of scientific method and assesses their relevance for Objectivism. Objectivism differentiates between the concepts of proof and validation. The system exploits the use of "concepts" that are generally not proven, but subject to validation. While proof is accomplished by logical deduction, validation is accomplished by the application of the scientific method. Fraedrich concludes that Error Statistics-based inference is objective and that it meets the desiderata of a normative methodology for scientific inference—a necessary condition for inclusion in Objectivist philosophy.

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