Pragmatic Reasoning About Unawareness

Erkenntnis 79 (S4):1-39 (2014)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Language use and interpretation is heavily contingent on context. But human interlocutors need not always agree what the actual context is. In game theoretic approaches to language use and interpretation, interlocutors’ beliefs about the context are the players’ beliefs about the game that they are playing. Together this entails that we need to consider cases in which interlocutors have different subjective conceptualizations of the game they are in. This paper therefore extends iterated best response reasoning, as an established model for pragmatic reasoning, to games with unawareness. This extension not only leads to more plausible context models for many communicative situations, but also to improved predictions for otherwise problematic cases and an extension of the scope of pragmatic phenomena that can be captured by game theoretic analysis

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 91,122

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Analytics

Added to PP
2013-03-27

Downloads
64 (#239,374)

6 months
20 (#114,012)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Citations of this work

On unidirectionality in precisification.Peter Klecha - 2018 - Linguistics and Philosophy 41 (1):87-124.
Stupefying.Michael Deigan - 2022 - Philosophers' Imprint 22 (1).

Add more citations

References found in this work

Logic and Conversation.H. P. Grice - 1975 - In Donald Davidson & Gilbert Harman (eds.), The Logic of Grammar. Encino, CA: pp. 64-75.
Quantity implicatures.Bart Geurts - 2010 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
Belief, awareness, and limited reasoning.Ronald Fagin & Joseph Y. Halpern - 1987 - Artificial Intelligence 34 (1):39-76.

View all 25 references / Add more references