Logica Universalis 9 (1):121-127 (2015)

Nissim Francez
Technion, Israel Institute of Technology
I show that in the context of proof-theoretic semantics, Dummett’s distinction between the assertoric meaning of a sentence and its ingredient sense can be seen as a distinction between two proof-theoretic meanings of a sentence: 1.Meaning as a conclusion of an introduction rule in a meaning-conferring natural-deduction proof system. 2.Meaning as a premise of an introduction rule in a meaning-conferring natural-deduction proof system. The effect of this distinction on compositionality of proof-theoretic meaning is discussed
Keywords Proof-theoretic semantics  assertoric contents  ingredient sense  meaning as premise  meaning as conclusion  compositionality
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DOI 10.1007/s11787-015-0118-8
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The Runabout Inference-Ticket.A. N. Prior - 1960 - Analysis 21 (2):38.
The Runabout Inference Ticket.Arthur Prior - 1967 - In Peter Strawson (ed.), Analysis. Oxford University Press. pp. 38-9.

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