Language, consciousness, and cross-modular thought

Behavioral and Brain Sciences 25 (6):685-686 (2002)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Carruthers suggests that natural language, in the form of inner speech, may be the vehicle of conscious propositional thought, but he argues that its fundamental cognitive role is as the medium of cross-modular thinking, both conscious and nonconscious. I argue that there is no evidence for nonconscious cross-modular thinking and that the most plausible view is that cross-modular thinking, like conscious propositional thinking, occurs only in inner speech.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 91,069

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Distinctively human thinking.Peter Carruthers - 1998 - In Peter Carruthers & Jill Boucher (eds.), Language and Thought. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 69.
Thinking in language?: Evolution and a modularist possibility.Peter Carruthers - 1998 - In Peter Carruthers & Jill Boucher (eds.), [Book Chapter]. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 94-119.
Internalizing communication.Gerard O'Brien & Jon Opie - 2002 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 25 (6):694-695.
Conscious thinking: Language or elimination?Peter Carruthers - 1998 - Mind and Language 13 (4):457-476.
Practical reasoning in a modular mind.Peter Carruthers - 2004 - Mind and Language 19 (3):259-278.
Conscious experience versus conscious thought.Peter Carruthers - 2005 - In Uriah Kriegel & Kenneth Williford (eds.), Consciousness and Self-Reference. MIT Press.

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
98 (#165,362)

6 months
2 (#725,330)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Keith Frankish
University of Sheffield

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

Consciousness Explained.Daniel C. Dennett - 1993 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 53 (4):905-910.
Phenomenal Consciousness: A Naturalistic Theory.Peter Carruthers - 2000 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
Phenomenal Consciousness: A Naturalistic Theory.Peter Carruthers - 2002 - Philosophical Quarterly 52 (207):265-268.
Consciousness Explained by Daniel C. Dennett. [REVIEW]Ned Block - 1993 - Journal of Philosophy 90 (4):181-193.

View all 7 references / Add more references