How we know our conscious minds: Introspective access to conscious thoughts

Behavioral and Brain Sciences 32 (2):145-146 (2009)
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Abstract

Carruthers considers and rejects a mixed position according to which we have interpretative access to unconscious thoughts, but introspective access to conscious ones. I argue that this is too hasty. Given a two-level view of the mind, we can, and should, accept the mixed position, and we can do so without positing additional introspective mechanisms beyond those Carruthers already recognizes

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2009-04-24

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Keith Frankish
University of Sheffield

Citations of this work

The apparent illusion of conscious deciding.Joshua Shepherd - 2013 - Philosophical Explorations 16 (1):18 - 30.

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References found in this work

The Varieties of Reference.Gareth Evans - 1982 - Oxford: Oxford University Press. Edited by John Henry McDowell.
Philosophical Investigations.Ludwig Wittgenstein - 1953 - New York, NY, USA: Wiley-Blackwell. Edited by G. E. M. Anscombe.
What is it like to be a bat?Thomas Nagel - 1974 - Philosophical Review 83 (October):435-50.

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