Everyone thinks that an ability to do otherwise is necessary for free will and moral responsibility

Philosophical Studies 172 (8):2091-2107 (2015)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Seemingly one of the most prominent issues that divide theorists about free will and moral responsibility concerns whether the ability to do otherwise is necessary for freedom and responsibility. I defend two claims in this paper. First, that this appearance is illusory: everyone thinks an ability to do otherwise is necessary for freedom and responsibility. The central issue is not whether the ability to do otherwise is necessary for freedom and responsibility but which abilities to do otherwise are necessary. Second, I argue that we cannot determine which abilities are necessary until we have determined the nature and justification of moral responsibility. Thus, theorizing about moral responsibility ought to take pride of place in theorizing about free will

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 91,102

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

New Essays on the Metaphysics of Moral Responsibility.Joseph Keim Campbell - 2008 - The Journal of Ethics 12 (3-4):193 - 201.
Betting Against Compatibilism.Göran Duus-Otterström - 2010 - Res Publica 16 (4):383-396.
An Analysis of Semi-Compatibilism.Gan Hun Ahn - 2008 - Proceedings of the Xxii World Congress of Philosophy 15:7-12.
Agnosticism about moral responsibility.Jeremy Byrd - 2010 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 40 (3):411-432.
Free will and moral responsibility.John Martin Fischer - 2004 - In David Copp (ed.), Handbook on Ethical Theory. Oxford University Press.
Abilities. [REVIEW]Randolph Clarke - 2013 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 86 (2):451-458.

Analytics

Added to PP
2014-10-13

Downloads
292 (#64,827)

6 months
12 (#137,533)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Citations of this work

Free will.Timothy O'Connor & Christopher Evan Franklin - 2018 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Self-expression: a deep self theory of moral responsibility.Chandra Sripada - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (5):1203-1232.
Moral Responsibility Without General Ability.Taylor W. Cyr & Philip Swenson - 2019 - Philosophical Quarterly 69 (274):22-40.
Actual Sequences, Frankfurt-Cases, and Non-accidentality.Heering David - 2022 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 65 (10):1269-1288.
Alternative possibilities in context.Alex Kaiserman - 2022 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 65 (10):1308-1324.

View all 15 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

What we owe to each other.Thomas Scanlon - 1998 - Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
Responsibility and Control: A Theory of Moral Responsibility.John Martin Fischer & Mark Ravizza - 1998 - New York: Cambridge University Press. Edited by Mark Ravizza.
Freedom of the will and the concept of a person.Harry G. Frankfurt - 1971 - Journal of Philosophy 68 (1):5-20.
An Essay on Free Will.Peter Van Inwagen - 1983 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Responsibility and the Moral Sentiments.R. Jay Wallace - 1994 - Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.

View all 64 references / Add more references