Evolutionary psychology versus Fodor: Arguments for and against the massive modularity hypothesis

Philosophical Psychology 20 (6):687 – 710 (2007)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Evolutionary psychologists tend to view the mind as a large collection of evolved, functionally specialized mechanisms, or modules. Cosmides and Tooby (1994) have presented four arguments in favor of this model of the mind: the engineering argument, the error argument, the poverty of the stimulus argument, and combinatorial explosion. Fodor (2000) has discussed each of these four arguments and rejected them all. In the present paper, we present and discuss the arguments for and against the massive modularity hypothesis. We conclude that Cosmides and Tooby's arguments have considerable force and are too easily dismissed by Fodor.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 91,122

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Fodor on cognition, modularity, and adaptationism.Samir Okasha - 2003 - Philosophy of Science 70 (1):68-88.
Is the mind really modular?Jesse J. Prinz - 2006 - In Robert J. Stainton (ed.), Contemporary Debates in Cognitive Science. Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 22--36.
On Fodor's The Mind Doesn't Work That Way.Daniel A. Weiskopf - 2002 - Philosophical Psychology 15 (4):551-562.
Massive Modularity and Brain Evolution.Edouard Machery - 2007 - Philosophy of Science 74 (5):825-838.
On the input problem for massive modularity.John M. Collins - 2004 - Minds and Machines 15 (1):1-22.
Simple heuristics meet massive modularity.Peter Carruthers - 2005 - In Peter Carruthers, Stephen Laurence & Stephen P. Stich (eds.), The Innate Mind: Structure and Contents. New York, US: Oxford University Press USA.
Dual process theories versus massive modularity hypotheses.Angeles Eraña - 2012 - Philosophical Psychology 25 (6):855-872.
Evolutionary psychology and the massive modularity hypothesis.Richard Samuels - 1998 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 49 (4):575-602.

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
181 (#102,828)

6 months
14 (#131,799)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?