Abstract

This article aims at showing that contemporary attempts to rehabilitat Pyrrhonian scepticism do not hold water. I claim that a sceptic of this trend gets stuck in two major dilemmas. The first regards her object of investigation. I argue that, if she holds that her object of investigation is the non-evident truth, she will not be able to distance herself from dogmatism. In turn, if she holds that she seeks to establish sense data propositions, she will not be able to pose herself as an investigator. The second dilemma stems from the sceptical attempt to wipe out dogmatism by developing arguments to the effect that no (dogmatic) proof exists. I contend that those arguments can be viewed either as "good" arguments, in which case the sceptic will be considered just another theorist in possession of an explanation, or as expendable devices, in which case the sceptic will be incapable of carrytng out her anti-dogmatic programme. Either way the sceptical position crumbles