Thomas Reid's Reply to Skepticism

Síntese Revista de Filosofia 47 (147):23-44 (2020)
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Abstract

The paper presents and discusses how Thomas Reid's philosophy of common sense replies to the skepticism about the epistemic reliability of the faculties of mind. The hypothesis presented establishes that Reid’s reply has three arguments. First, Reid shows why it is impossible to prove the reliability of the faculties of mind and why philosophers may begin their investigations by accepting the truth of the beliefs due to these faculties. Secondly, Reid shows that it is inconsistent to choose one of these faculties as the only source of true beliefs. This is arbitrary. Those authors, who choose, for example, consciousness as the only source of reliable knowledge, only reinforce the claim that all faculties of mind are equally reliable. Thirdly, if the faculties of the mind operate properly, that is, when our mind is not affected by any disorder or disease, there is no good reason to call them into question and to doubt the truth of their beliefs.

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Vinícius França Freitas
Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais (Alumnus)

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