Abstract

Andrew Walton argues that a Rawlsian property-owning democracy requires a fraternal ethos and certain forms of social interaction, such as high trade union membership. The basic structure objection could be used to challenge these claims as it indicates that Rawls’s principles of justice should only be applied to the basic structure of society, and not, for example, to an ethos. Walton has two responses to the objection: firstly, that it does not apply to his argument, and, secondly, even if it were to apply, the objection itself is unconvincing. In this article I argue however that the basic structure objection does apply as a fraternal ethos is difficult to reconcile with Rawls’s understanding of what should be included as part of the basis structure, and although I do not defend the basic structure objection, it is not made explicit in Walton’s argument why the objection should be dismissed as unconvincing