The Priority of the Good Over Right in Love: Challenging Velleman’s Kantian View

Etyka 52:47-57 (2016)
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Abstract

In Love as a Moral Emotion David Velleman rejects the conative analysis of love arguing instead for a conception which is modelled after Kantian respect. The general problem associated with conative views of love according to Velleman is that they cut love loose from morality, sometimes characterizing its aims as in conflict with morality.

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10.14394/etyka.493

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