The percept and vector function theories of the brain

Philosophy of Science 55 (December):511-537 (1988)
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Abstract

Physicalism is an empirical theory of the mind and its place in nature. So the physicalist must show that current neuroscience does not falsify physicalism, but instead supports it. Current neuroscience shows that a nervous system is what I call a vector function system. I provide a brief outline of the resources that empirical research has made available within the constraints of the vector function approach. Then I argue that these resources are sufficient, indeed apt, for the physicalist enterprise, by offering a vector functional, hence physicalist, theory of the percept--the perceptual experience itself, a paradigm of phenomenally immediate, introspectively accessible consciousness

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Citations of this work

On the logic of what it is like to be a conscious subject.Jeff Foss - 1989 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 67 (2):305-320.
The Dynamics of Thought.Peter Gardenfors - 2005 - Dordrecht, Netherland: Springer.
Is the mind-body problem empirical?Jeffrey Foss - 1987 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 17 (September):505-32.

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Sensations and brain processes.Jjc Smart - 1959 - Philosophical Review 68 (April):141-56.
The Problems of Philosophy.Bertrand Russell - 1912 - Mind 21 (84):556-564.

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